- Company providing parts for F-16s, F-35s, and missiles has CEO with extensive ties to Chinese Communist Party intelligence agencies.
- Concerns raised about potential national security risks and supply chain vulnerabilities.
- CEO denies ties to foreign political entities, but acknowledges attending events with high-ranking CCP officials.
A Daily Caller News Foundation investigation has revealed that S&L Aerospace Metals LLC, a US defense contractor supplying critical parts for American military aircraft and advising the government on supply chain security, is owned by an immigrant with deep connections to Chinese Communist Party (CCP) intelligence and influence operations. S&L, which has been awarded tens of millions of dollars in defense contracts, serves on a Department of Homeland Security (DHS) council on critical manufacturing. The company’s CEO, Jerry Wang (Chinese name Wang Jue), has been identified in Chinese government and state media reports as an official for multiple CCP intelligence and influence organizations, raising serious concerns about potential ties to the highest levels of the CCP, including Chinese dictator Xi Jinping.
Wang, through his attorney, denied any connections to “foreign political entities,” but did not deny being photographed at numerous Chinese government and CCP intelligence agency functions alongside high-ranking Party officials.
Former U.S. Air Force intelligence analyst L.J. Eads called it a “glaring national security failure” to allow someone with Wang’s background access to sensitive information about U.S. supply chains and critical manufacturing vulnerabilities. He expressed concern that the CCP is being given a “front-row seat to our most sensitive industries.”
Neither the Department of Defense (DOD) nor DHS responded to requests for comment.
CCP Influence and Intelligence Links
Wang’s affiliations with organizations run by the United Front Work Department (UFWD), a CCP intelligence and influence arm, have been documented. The UFWD is known for its “unique blend of engagement, influence activities, and intelligence operations” used to shape the political environment and gain access to foreign technology, according to the House Select Committee on the CCP.
Rep. John Moolenaar (R-MI), chairman of the House Select Committee on the CCP, called the reports “shocking” and emphasized that no entity affiliated with the UFWD should be allowed to infiltrate the U.S. defense supply chain.
Chinese government records and state media identify Wang as a “director” of the China Overseas Friendship Association (COFA), a UFWD organization described by the U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission as an “important platform” for the UFWD to interact with overseas figures. Footage from a 2019 COFA conference in Beijing shows Wang applauding Xi Jinping. He is also identified as a “deputy chairman” of COFA’s Zhejiang branch.
Photos also place Wang at multiple New York welcome events for Xi Jinping dating back to 2006.
An S&L spokesperson stated that Wang has not belonged to any organizations serving the CCP or the UFWD. Wang’s attorney insisted he has no ties to foreign political entities but did not deny his presence in photographs at Chinese government functions.
One photo shows Wang in Beijing with the deputy director of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and other delegates attending the Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference (CPPCC), an organization described as “proxies for CCP interests” by the U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission. Another article pictures Wang at an event held by the UFWD and the All-China Federation Of Returned Overseas Chinese (ACFROC), where he is identified as an “overseas committee member” and “executive deputy chairman” of its Zhejiang youth committee. He is pictured alongside Linda Sun, a former aide to NY Governor Kathy Hochul, who was indicted for acting as a Chinese agent.
National Security Threat
Former military and intelligence analyst Edward L. Haugland warned of the national security threat posed by Wang’s apparent ties, emphasizing China’s strategy to exploit vulnerabilities in U.S. national security. He highlighted the access to sensitive information, even unclassified, as a significant risk.
S&L has received approximately $60 million in defense contracts and serves on a DHS council for critical manufacturing security. The company produces parts for prominent aircraft manufacturers like Lockheed Martin and Boeing.
Lockheed Martin stated they take a “multi-faceted approach to assess and mitigate supply chain risks.” Boeing did not respond to requests for comment.
S&L’s most lucrative contracts are with the Defense Logistics Agency (DLA). Federal records show contracts for aircraft landing gear components, cylinders and pistons, and even weapon systems.
The DLA stated that the Pentagon requires agencies to mitigate risks related to foreign ownership of contractors. However, Eads characterized the vetting process as a “self-disclosure system” with “significant blind spots.”
Brian O’Shea, another former military and intelligence analyst, emphasized the threat to the U.S. military’s supply chain, particularly the potential disruption of logistics.
Eads further warned that Wang’s position on the DHS Critical Manufacturing Sector Coordinating Council (CMSCC) provides both insight into potential risks and opportunities to exploit vulnerabilities. He argued that a Chinese government asset could promote foreign agendas, influence policies, and steal intellectual property.
Eads concluded that the U.S. government must prevent individuals with Chinese government ties from operating as defense contractors and participating in critical councils like the CMSCC. He urged Congress to intervene and address this “blatant national security threat.”
This article has been written with the assistance of Google Gemini AI. Please email admin AT thenewdigital.ca with any inaccuracies.
